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Novelty and Causality in William
James’s Pluralistic Universe




1 In  an  interesting  work  in  which  he  reconstructs  the  history  of  the  concept  of  the
emergent in psychology and sociology, R. Keith Sawyer (2002) identifies for psychology
four schools of  investigation:  the so-called British emergentism, Gestalt  psychology,
American Pragmatism (until the 30s) and the recent philosophy of mind and cognitive
sciences  (1970s-90s).  Sawyer’s  intention  is  twofold.  On  the  one  hand,  he  aims  to
reconstruct the history of the conception of emergentism, starting with the works of
Comte, Durkheim, James and Lewes as well as German organicists, to show how some of
their  insights  have profoundly  influenced the formation of  contemporary cognitive
sciences and philosophy of mind. Secondly, given the original proximity of psychology
and sociology, this reconstruction is propaedeutic to showing that the reflections on
emergence,  particularly  in  authors  such  as  Durkheim  and  Parsons,  have  played  a
crucial antireductionist  role  by  disengaging  the  science  of  social  phenomena  from
psychology. 
2 The philosophical psychology of William James is, in this perspective, seminal for the
development of the reflection on the concept of the emergent in both psychology and
sociology. Leaving aside, as a possible next step, the investigation of the philosophical
implications  of  the  reception  of  Jamesian  psychology  by  the  social  sciences,  which
developed later also through the recovery that G. H. Mead made of it, in this article I
propose to analyze the concept of the emergent that James elaborates in the territory
between  psychology  and  metaphysics.  This  is  another  way  to  understand  the
problematic relationship between novelty and continuity, that is to say, the issue of the
emergence of genuinely new events in a paradigm of natural continuity,  which has
been analyzed in different fields by Peirce, Dewey, and Mead. As for James’s psychology
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and philosophy, I intend to devote attention to the concept of causality that James will
profoundly challenge already in his Principles of Psychology (PP) and then both in some
articles  of  the early  twentieth century and,  in a  more systematic  way,  in his  more
distinctly metaphysical texts: Some Problems of Philosophy (SPP) and A Pluralistic Universe
(PU).  It  is  my conviction that  a  reflection on the concept  of  causality  allows us  to
understand better the role  of  James’s  epistemological  and metaphysical  thinking in
today’s theories of emergence.1 
3 James is often cited by theorists of emergence.2 Jaegwon Kim (2005) argues that Huxley
and James already posed the “explanatory/predictive questions” on mental causation
and consciousness made by classic emergentists. However, following Stephan’s (1999)
classic distinction of three main varieties of emergentism, the Jamesian perspective is
difficult to classify.3 For a great number of emergentists, physical monism is taken for
granted  whatever  version  of  natural  emergentism  one  may  adopt.  Like  other
pragmatists,  James  is  instead  clearly  committed  to  an  anti-reductionist  version  of
naturalism, which makes his naturalism suitable of different interpretations.4 In his
Principles he explicitly adopts the “anti-supernaturalism animus” of scientists, but is
not satisfied with a superficial opposition between natural and supernatural causes.
Talking about the use of the word “experience,” for instance, a term that expressed the
naturalistic perspective, James opposed a purely “ideological” use of this term in favor
of  a  more  sophisticated  understanding  of  different  sorts  of  natural  agency (see
chapter XXVIII),  and  therefore  of  causality.  Pihlström  (2002)  showed  how  most
emergentist theories, even those by Stephan and Kim, end up in sharing at least what
Kim calls “a minimal physicalism” (Kim 2005: 13), an expression he uses to define his own
theory of mind-body supervenience.
4 James is also mentioned in the renewed debate on panpsychism. Brüntrup and Jaskolla
recently wrote about contemporary attempts to re-evaluate “quiddities” in order to
metaphysically  ground  the  emergence  of  higher  levels  of  consciousness  in  both
contemporary physics (Stapp 2007) and neuroscience (Koch & Tononi 2015). For Seager
(2009), all founders of scientific psychology, namely Fechner, Wundt, Lotze, and James,
were  somehow  panpsychists.  He  particularly  underlines  the  tension  between
emergentist  and  panpsychist  commitments  in  James,  and  confesses  that  James’s
position remains unclear. James’s sixth chapter of Principles is the “locus classicus” of
the  so-called  “combination  problem”5 for  panpsychists  since  as  recently  put  by
Chalmers, any  version  of  panpsychism  that holds  microexperiences  combine  to
produce macroexperiences is in trouble (Chalmers 2016). However, James would have
also defended one of the three main arguments used in favor of panpsychism later
recovered  by  Thomas  Nagel:  the  genetic  argument,  according  to  which  “if  human
consciousness is to evolve from a physical basis, then basic forms of mental being need
to be present at the fundament of this evolutionary process” (Bru ̈ntrup & Jaskolla 2016:
3). 
5 My investigation on James’s understanding of mental causation goes in the direction
traced  by  Pihlström:  that  of  reconsidering  pragmatists  as  emergentists  of  a  non-
reductionist  kind  within  a  renovelled  framework.  James’s  theoretical  use  of
evolutionary  theories,6 his  interdisciplinary  training  as  well  as  the  not-yet-
institutionalized context of the sciences in which he worked, contributed to making
him well aware of the ontological and epistemological issues linked to the assumption
of a full emergentist or anti-reductionist perspective. This awareness is revealed by his
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oscillation between more or less vitalistic positions on “emergentism” which he seems
to adopt through his life. On the one hand, his debt to the philosophy and logic of John
Stuart Mill is well known. James dedicated his book Pragmatism (1907) to the memory of
Mill, who is unanimously considered the inspiration behind the concept of emergence,
which  is  then  taken  up  and  developed  by  his  colleague  G. H. Lewes  and  later  by
evolutionist  philosophers  such  as  Morgan,  Alexander,  and  Spaulding  in  a  more
naturalistic vein (McLaughlin 1992). On the other hand, we have to consider James’s
fascination for his French colleague Bergson, particularly for the latter’s robust and
acute critique of deterministic materialism, his processual metaphysics and also his
eventual  arrival  at  a  spiritualist  position.  According  to  his  statements,  James
considered himself not to be a materialist or a spiritualist but a “natural realist” (De
Sanctis 1906: 155). The aim of this article is precisely to attempt to clarify what this
naturalism consists  of  in  the  light  of  emergentist  conceptions  by  focusing upon his
understanding of causation between psychology and metaphysics.
 
Novelty and Causality
6 In Appendix C of A Pluralistic Universe (1909),7 James takes up the Aristotelian principle
that whatever is affirmed or denied of an entire class or kind may be affirmed or denied
of  any  part  of  it  in  the  formulation  that  he  calls  “skipped  intermediaries  and
transferred relations” (PU: 151). This logical principle applies to a series of abstract
terms – or, rather, as James already wrote in his Principles of Psychology (1890), following
Augustus De Morgan’s Syllabus, to homogeneous series, though not to all of them: there
are relations, such as causality, that are intrinsically transferable, and others such as
negation, that are not (cf. PP II: 1254). He seems now to make a further distinction as to
the objects to which these logical rules apply. There are abstract objects, which are
entirely covered by Aristotle’s law, and concrete objects, which instead escape the law
for certain relations and under certain respects. As regards the principle of causality,
for instance, the Aristotelian rule would provide for the linear transfer of a cause to the
effects of another cause, which is the effect of the first cause only in series of abstract
objects. In the concrete dimension in which objects do not possess their characteristics
in purity,  it  is  instead complicated to argue in favor of  this  linearity,  as in James’s
example of commodore Perry and the Duma. One may state that commodore Matthew
Perry, commander of the naval expedition that forced Japan to establish diplomatic
relations with the United States in 1853-4, was the cause of the establishment of the
Duma in Russia.8 However, in a series of real terms such as these, hardly any “real or
practical relationship to each other” (PU: 152) holds up because of the vast space-time
distance that has occurred between their appearances. Within a temporal perspective,
which is that of the practical world, many changes occur between the two events that
break in a certain sense the possible direct connection between Perry’s unconfirmed
intentions and the aforementioned political outcomes. There is a double level of change
that has to be considered: not only do the terms we are considering change, with their
contexts and relations, but the meaning that we interpreters attribute to those terms
changes as well. It is a matter of experience that new paths of investigation continuously
open  up  and  show  new  possible  connections  that  stimulate  our  research  interests
towards new directions. Therefore, in the perspective of the vast natural connections
we live in, and given the unavoidable relevance of our practical interests in all sorts of
investigations, it is not possible to speak of a linear transfer of causal relations without
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carefully qualifying the conditions. Moreover, it would be, in a sense, a useless self-
limitation to persist in following the terms of an abstract linear causality within the
broader and thicker landscape of concrete reality. As a result of new experiences, in the
course of our research, it is also possible to change the intention with which we began
to investigate, so that the effort to stick to the terms that are still covered by the logic
law is  not  worthy of  the changing investigation –  it  would be like climbing a high
mountain and then focusing on a single  inessential  detail,  losing the beauty of  the
landscape view. 
7 This appendix is a critical element in our investigation of the conception of emerging
novelty in James’s vision. In addition to the obvious connection between novelty and
causality – where causality can be seen as a sub-problem of novelty – it shows the main
and  most  mature  traits  of  his  criticism  of  an  eviscerated view  of  the  principle  of
causality and, more generally, of logic. With the backing of Bergson’s idea of devenir réel
and trying to combine it with Peirce’s conception of agapasticism as developed in the
early  1890s,9 James  demonstrates  both  his  constant  and  strict  criticism  of  the
philosophical tendency to indiscriminately apply formal logical rules to the world of
real  operations,  and  his  sharing  of  Bergson’s  and  Peirce’s  vision  of  novelty  as
something genuinely real, not just appearance.
8 The  problem  of  novelty  arises  even  more  distinctly  in  the  ontological  continuist
framework  inherited  from  Darwinism  and  adopted  by  the  empirical  sciences.  The
emergence of something genuinely new from the continuous is problematic because it
seems to imply creation ex nihilo and hence to break the rational order of the continuity
of the real. It is at this point that Peircean “agapasticism,” as a synthesis of “tychism”
and  “synechism,”  or  of  chance  and  continuity,  together  with  the  idea  of  creative
evolution elaborated autonomously by Bergson, come to the rescue: “To an observer
standing outside of its generating causes, novelty can appear only as so much ‘chance,’
while to one who stands inside it is the expression of ‘free creative activity’.” (PU: 153).
This  statement  is  very  significant  for  understanding  James’s  interpretation  of  the
respective conceptions of his colleagues. It is clear that for James, the human agent is
the model of causal agency on the basis of which it is possible to identify the natural
causal  agency.  In  other  words,  James  refers  to  the  human agent  as  the  analogatum 
princeps of an analogical argument between human nature and “natural” nature itself.
However, there is another crucial step to take that is related to the free and creative
dimension of the activity mentioned by James. As we shall see, for James, the matrix of
our conception of a real cause is to be found in our physiological experience of the
activity. Since psychologically speaking, free activity is the activity governed by our
conscious  will,  one  can  well  envisage  the  connection  between  his  ontological
conception  of  the  novelty  of  reality  and that  of  the  novelty  introduced  by  free
voluntary actions.10 
Novelty,  as  empirically  found,  doesn’t  arrive  by  jumps  and  jolts,  it  leaks  in
insensibly,  for  adjacents  in  experience  are  always  interfused,  the  smallest  real
datum being both a coming and a going, and even numerical distinctness being
realized effectively  only after  a  concrete interval  has passed.  The intervals  also
deflect us from the original paths of direction, and all the all identities at last give
out, for the fatally continuous infiltration of otherness warps things out of every
original rut. (PU: 153)
9 The conception of novelty proposed by Peirce and Bergson is interpreted by James as a
novelty that emerges in the same continuous texture of experience. His reference to
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the “smallest real datum” of experience immediately reminds not only of his notion of
finite drops (SPP: 80) by which reality grows but also of his well-known psychological
conception  of  thought  as  a  continuous  stream presented  in  the  ninth  chapter  of
Principles. We should notice that in Principles, James’s pluralism is quite prominent in
this  respect.  He  believes  that  the  distinction  between  personal  selves,  or  better
between thoughts that belong to different selves, constitutes an irremediable breach in
nature governed by a law of “absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism” (PP I:  221).
Against  associationist  psychology,  James’s  correct  application  of  empirical
methodology leads him to consider not sensations,11 but personal thoughts to be the
real elementary psychic facts in psychology. Following Shadworth H. Hodgson, James
harshly criticizes the so-called “theory of ideas” according to which there are mental
atoms or  molecules  that  remain unchanged amid the  flow of  thinking.12 Concretely
taken,  thoughts  exist  in  personal  minds,  and  all  the  classes  of  consciousness  are
complex  states  having  a  temporal  breadth that  we  immediately  experience  as  a
synthetic datum.13 
 
Conceptualist vs. Perceptualist View of Causality
10 In Some Problems of Philosophy, James continues to investigate and tries to systematize
the philosophical implications of the pluralistic metaphysics that he proposed in more
detail in the eight Hibbert Lectures on “The Present Situation in Philosophy” held in
1908 at Manchester College in Oxford, later published under the title of A Pluralistic
Universe (1909). The philosophical need to adopt a pluralistic metaphysical vision is a
central preoccupation of his final reflections for several reasons. First, metaphysical
pluralism is a useful framework for applying the methodological pluralism in which
James trusted, and which he had made use of already in his Principles. However, further,
pluralism is  the  consequence  of  an  active  vision  of  human  mental  activity  and
therefore,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  intimately  connected  to  the  assessment  of  genuine
novelty. 
11 The structure of the book edited by Burkhardt (1979)14 presents the treatment of the
problem of novelty in chapter six, while the so-called subproblems of novelty – which
are, in order, the problem of continuum and infinity (chapter seven), and the problem
of causality from a conceptual perspective (chapter seven) and from a perceptual point
of view (chapter eight) – are developed through the three following chapters. 
12 It is not an easy task to unravel the full depth of James’s mature philosophical vision as
he was trying to synthesize it  in this book. His argumentation is very complex and
above  all  stratified:  some  assumptions  are  not  comprehensible  outside  the  general
framework  of  reference  that  James  has  built  over  the  years  in  a  cross-disciplinary
fashion, and that he tries to recapitulate here in brief and dense sentences. However, I
believe  that  the  best  way  to  read  these  texts  is  through  the  lens  of  his  radical
empiricism. Since his Principles, James’s increasingly vigorous attempt has been to offer
a contemporary and credible version of empiricism. Such an attempt can be outlined as
an amendment of the main psychological and logical faults into which the empiricist 
authors have plunged. In this case, for James, Hume is the prototype of half-hearted
empiricists  (SPP:  100),  for  he  limited  himself  to  accepting  the  pluralistic  soul  of
empiricism while  rejecting both the idea of  novelty  and that  of  activity  (free-will).
These  two  hypotheses,  by  contrast,  are  essential  to  the  radically  empirical
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philosophical vision promoted by James since the 1890s.15 In brief, it is in the context of
his  attempt  to  establish  a  genuinely  empirical  psychology that  James  finds  himself
confronted  with  the  philosophical  problem  of  the  nature of  relations.  Only  by
succeeding in describing it in terms of particular external or accidental relations, will it
be possible to philosophically rehabilitate an enriched conception of experience and a
pluralistic  conception  of  reality  in  which  novelty  and  free-will  are  not  so  easily
discredited by an only seemingly rigorous logical and scientific reasoning. 
13 In this broader framework, his insistence on the necessity of a different understanding
of the principle of causality finds its proper place. Causality is, in fact, a principle of
logical  relation, the  principle  radically  questioned  by  Hume,  and  incorrectly
interpreted in  a  materialistic sense  by  most  intellectuals.  On a  severe  rethinking  of
cause-effect relations in part depends the possibility of real novelty, and finally, since
free voluntary activities  are considered as acts  that  introduce genuine novelty into
reality,16 it is easy to see why the problem of novelty occupies a significant portion of
James’s last philosophical efforts.
14 The principle of  causality has generally  been interpreted as saying that,  in specific
ways, the effects are already contained in the causes. If this is true, then there is no
genuine novelty and, as a consequence, no pluralistic vision can be true. James intends
to conduct a historical-epistemological analysis of the meaning assumed by the concept
of causality. He aims to show that both a conceptual translation of the facts of causality
and  the  perceptual  translation  made  by  empiricism  are  just  different  methods  of
looking at the reality that is eventually based on different preferences.
15 As to what concerns the rationalization of causality, however, it began with Aristotle.
From the  scholastic  interpretation  of  his  “efficient  cause,”  as  “that  which  produces
something else by real activity proceeding from itself” (SPP: 97),17 three logical implications
were derived: namely, that (1) there must be a cause for an effect to occur; (2) that a
proportion between cause and effect is necessary; and (3) that what is the effect should
be aliquo modo in its cause. The rationalizing trend dominating the history of western
philosophy established the epistemic priority of concepts over perceptions, considering
perceptions to be fallible and therefore incapable of founding knowledge. This view
also  profoundly  affected  the  perceptual  view  of  causation  and  led  to  an  almost
complete “overthrow of perception by conception” (SPP: 98). The perceptual process of
production,18 too difficult to explain in conceptual terms, was, in fact, translated into a
relation of logical consequence that contradicts everyday experience: 
The  cause  becomes  a  reason,  the  effect  a  consequence;  and  since  logical
consequence follows only from the same to the same, the older vaguer causation-
philosophy develops into the sharp rationalistic dogma that cause and effect are
two names  for  one  persistent  being  and that  if  the  successive  moments  of the
universe be causally connected, no genuine novelty leaks in. (SPP: 98)
16 Even  scholasticism  maintained  in  its  definition  the  expression  “aliquo  modo”  to
guarantee the possibility of a slight difference between cause and effect, and in this
way to avoid completely disregarding the common-sense acknowledge of causality. The
intellectualist  reading of  causation,  instead,  which is  for  James a  perversion of  the
correct use of our intellectual faculty, produced the logical exclusion of the possibility
of real novelty as a mere unfaithful impression of our senses. 
17 In Chapter four, stating the distinction between percepts and concepts, he dwelled on
showing how our inability to translate into a conceptual language the phenomena of
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the  change  and  growth  of  reality  to  be  to  the  detriment  of  ordinary  perceptual
experience. Since the conceptual vocabulary can only nominate these living processes,
but it cannot embrace them unless by way of distorting them, it is not possible to fully
translate  perceptual  processes  into  conceptual  expressions.  From  the  fact  that  we
cannot correctly say, for instance, the process of change, conceptual language gets into
the habit of denying its existence. It is a sort of “colonization process” whereby the
conceptual  impotence to say something is  converted into the power to negate that
which does not fall within its linguistic domain. 
18 This perspective is connected with a form of ontological dualism that from Descartes
onwards  considers  mental  and  physical  matters  as  distinct  substances.  No  causal
relationship  between  mind  and  body  could  be  rational  in  this  perspective.  In  the
monistic attempt to solve this problem, first occasionalism and then Leibniz’s theory of
pre-established harmony achieved rationalistic domination over the immediate data, in
particular  by  conceptually  translating  and  finally  depriving  of  their  perceptual
qualities the notions of activity and continuity. As mentioned before, Hume, the “half-
hearted” empiricist, has gone so far as to deny any impression or idea of necessary
connection. He maintained that our pseudo-idea of connection only derives from the
habit of repetitively experiencing the same succession of events, and forming from this
usual expectation produced by our imaginative faculty the impression of the idea of
necessary connection. On the one side, Hume was a radical pluralist, for he considered
events to be disconnected; on the other, however, he was a rationalist, for he believed
in the uniformity of natural events, and thus refused to admit that really new events
can emerge. 
19 For  James,  causality  is  one of  the  forms in  which the  perceptive  continuity  of  our
experience is manifested. On a perceptual level, concrete causal relationships are how
we describe the transition from one mental state to another: “the manner in which
some fields of consciousness introduce other fields” (SPP: 100) – which is what James
calls  the  co-conscious  transition (ERE:  25).  At  this  point,  James’s  remarks  get  more
complicated. Firstly,  he claims that we have a keen capacity to discriminate among
different  sections  of  continuity  of  experience.  In  fact,  just  as  we  use  the  idea  of
causality for  the  co-conscious  relationship,  we  use  prepositions  and  conjunctions
instead to indicate other aspects of experiential continuity. Secondly, recovering an
argument  he  used  already  in  his  Principles,  he  stigmatizes  Hume’s  adoption  of  the
intellectualist rule according to which separate names should correspond to separate
facts so that if there is not an identifiable fact that matches its name, that name is
meaningless. Now, James’s conviction is that Hume has made a mistake in his starting-
point  and  consequently,  in  all  his  reasoning.  In  fact,  experience  is  in  its  original
constitution  continuous,  concrete  facts  and  meanings  are  “fringed”  –  just  like  our
mental states are (cf. PP I: 249). Therefore, it is not possible to find pure, ideal atomic
elements  in  immediate  experience  corresponding  to  the  words  with  which  we
nominate it. Our capacity for abstraction works on this original continuity, focusing
attention on some aspects and extrapolating them for the sake of practical operations,
but it cannot break its continuous structure. 
Causal activity, in short, may play its part in growing fact, even tho no substantive “
impression” of it should stand out by itself. Hume’s assumption that any factor of
reality must be separable, leads to his preposterous view that no relations can be
real. (SPP: 101)
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20 Hume’s empiricist preference for facts does not prevent him from dismissing an entire
class of facts just because these facts do not have the same separate form that words
have.  As  to  causality,  the  Scottish  philosopher  was  not  able  to  find  an  impression
corresponding to the relation of causality because he was looking for some discrete
element of sensation, some standing impression of it whereas James claims that facts
originally come in the form of “perceptual durcheinander” (SPP: 100).19 
21 Then Kant agreed with Hume on the multiplicity of perceptual immediacy but tried to
recover it  by introducing a transcendental  ego and its  synthetic  categories,  so that
causality  is  a  category.  In  his  analysis  of  Kant’s  chapter  “The  Second  Analogy  of
Experience” in his First Critique (2nd ed.), James believes that like Hume, Kant has, in
fact, destroyed the idea of dynamic causation and replaced it with a mere temporal
succession of events. He found a similarity between the Humean notion of “habit” and
the Kantian notion of “rule.” In brief, Hume took the time-succession to be “loose” and
its uniformity a subjective impression, while for Kant uniformity was objective in so far
as our sensibility is  ruled by reason. Accordingly,  Kant’s  category of causality gives
nothing but an external description of sequences of events, and James observes that,
like many laws of nature, Kant’s causality only states co-existence and succession. It
inductively  generalizes  sequences  of  facts  but  does  not  unite them  in  some  more
intimate way. 
22 More  generally,  he  found  that  the  positivistic  approach  of  science  is  to  reply  to
questions for an explanation of phenomena – the why questions – with more and more
generalized descriptions of  them. According to  the inductive methodology,  the less
general laws are continually referred to the more general ones, and that is all there is
to do.20 In search of a more intimate explanation of causal sequences than that provided
by positivist empiricism, James hints at the monistic tendency of some contemporary
scientists, such as Lewes, Riehl, Heymans, and Bowne, to deduce facts from previous
facts.  This  way  of  proceeding  would  be  an  interpretation  of  the  aforementioned
scholastic  principle  of  proportionality between causes  and effects  so  that  the  effects
would be nothing more than successive appearances of the cause that have no scientific
value. It is clear that by reducing causality to a relation of identity, these writers consider
natural phenomena of variety, activity, and novelty as mere illusions or by-products
(SPP: 103n). However, this is often a somewhat artificial scientific explanation, not a
valid metaphysical assumption, which is useful for scientists to predict facts elegantly. 
23 This conceptualist vision of causality represents for James the main polemical object, in
order for him to promote a radically genuine, additive idea of novelty that supports his
pluralistic  metaphysics.  Their  mistake  is  the  same  as  that  made  by  Hume,  that  is,
without finding in reality a discrete phenomenon that corresponded to our concept of
causal  “power,”  they  indeed  deleted  “the  activity-feature  of  the  sequence.”  They
intellectually operate a replacement for the perception of the causal connection with a
“static relation of identity between two concepts” (SPP: 104). To stress how the view of
logicians  contradicts  both  our  instinct  and  our  common-sense  notion  of  causality,
James quotes a passage from Wilhelm Jerusalem’s Einleitung in die Philosophie (1906), in
which  the  author  discusses  the  possibility  for  mathematicians  to  make  use  of  a
generalized conception of function to describe quantitative and qualitative relations.
The world of scientific logic results in being abstract, an “unearthly ballet of bloodless
categories” (SPP: 104), in which change happens, but it remains somewhat unexplained
for neither reasons nor activities play any dynamic causal role.
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24 As far as the alternative perceptual view of causality is concerned, that advocated by
James, it must be pointed out that the need to adopt a critical approach to perceptual
data is not at stake. There are, in fact, many perceptual errors that we ordinarily make,
for example, by attributing a direct causal power to certain things without considering
all  the  more  complex  chains  of  causal  successions.21 However,  while  accepting  the
critical premises of the conceptualist view, James refutes their skeptical conclusion as
incongruous. As with many other parts of sensible experience, it would be a fallacious
argument to deduce from perceptual errors of localization that perceptions are entirely
false and that change, activity, movement, and novelty do not exist at all. For the sake
of clarity, I summarise how James’s argument develops as follows: 
(1) the meaning of causation is derived from an original perceptual experience; 
(2) the perceptual experience from which we derive the meaning of causation is that of
personal activity-situations; 
(3)  he offers a  psychological  description of  the causal  process as a  process that we
experience in our consciousness of activity; 
(3a) vague hypothesis that desire and will are unconditional causes; 
(3b) psychophysiological criticism of our consciousness of activity; 
(3c)  logical  conclusion:  the  nature  of  causation  may  be  given  in  experience,  but
philosophy must ascertain the mind-body relation. 
(4) Further difficulties: pan-psychic philosophy and brain physiology. 
25 Among the many interesting aspects of James’s argument, we will underline that the
process that James currently uses as a reference in analogy with the natural world is
always that of the stream of thought, that is, the felt continuity between successive
fields  of  consciousness.  In  this  view,  it  is  more  comprehensible  why  co-conscious
transitions constitute a core problem of all James’s reflection. Moreover, within such an
embodied perspective, how we as human beings are physiologically able to feel things
inevitably shapes how we understand them. The perceptive experience of the process of
conscious transition that happens in us when we activate ourselves in view of a result
constitutes the authentic matrix of our conception of activity. In the flow of thought,
desires and will are real causal agents, and they also respect the scholastic definition of
containing “somehow” their effect. In fact, the desire for a specific result contains – in
the sense of  being in harmonious continuity  with –  the field  of  consciousness  that
corresponds to the realization of the activity. However, desire contains effects only in a
general way  as  a  kind  of  direction  in  which  external  agents  also  intervene  and
contribute to forming the final result, which is not entirely predictable. Following Mill,
our will can be an unconditioned cause, in the sense of being an indispensable cause,
but not a close one.22 The close or direct continuity that our perception suggests to us in
our activity-experiences is not easily proved at the physiological level of analysis, for
our  will  is  not  causally  continuous  with  its  apparent  effects.  In  between are  many
causal successions – neural, muscular, and instrumental intermediaries – which remain
entirely  unknown to  our  perception.  Even if  James can work out  a  possible  logical
objection to this psychophysiological criticism,23 he prefers to stop his investigation
here  for  the  moment.  After  having  shown  the  main  conflicting  results  of  the
conceptualist  and the  perceptual  treatment  of  causality,  in  wanting  to  explore  the
perceptual view further, James would have to face at least two significant difficulties.
On  a  microscopic  level,  such  would  be  the  problems  related  to  the  physiological
discontinuity of will-acts, i.e., the mind-body problem; on a macroscopic scale, instead,
James would have to be ready to extend his conception of an inwardly experiential
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nature for activity-experiences to physical cases of causality, thus having to face the
implications of a pan-psychic philosophy.24 
 
The Problem of Causation in Psychology
26 The problem of causal connections has already appeared in the Principles of Psychology.
As we have mentioned, still in A Pluralistic Universe, there is a direct reference to the last
chapter of his Principles. If we examine the pages dedicated to metaphysical axioms, as
ideal unverified relations, we find these following comments on the notion of cause:
Take for example the principle that “nothing can happen without a cause.” We have
no  definite  idea  of  what  we  mean  by  cause,  or  of  what  causality  consists  in.
However,  the  principle  expresses  a  demand  for  some deeper  sort  of  inward
connection between phenomena than their merely habitual time-sequence seems to
us to be.  The word “cause” is,  in short,  an altar to an unknown god;  an empty
pedestal still marking the place of a hoped-for statue. (PP II: 1264)
27 The notion of cause is metaphysical in this case, representing the need for there to be a
deeper  level  of  connection  in  reality  than  what  is  empirically  verifiable.  Some
interesting insights into James’s conception of causality in psychology can be found in
Chapters V, VI, and XI, as well as in the more well-known Chapters IX, X, and XXVI. For
the latter, to which we will refer here and there, I recommend other works, while we
will try to focus on some aspects of the other chapters that are relevant to our inquiry.
28 In Chapter XI, James analyses the phenomenon of attention. It becomes more evident
the  criticism  that  James  makes  of  classical  empirical  psychologists  such  as  Locke,
Hume, Hartley, James and John S. Mill, and also Spencer. These authors, unlike German
scholars, have largely ignored the phenomenon of selective attention – which James
began to explore in the previous chapters on consciousness and the self. The reason for
such an omission is  to be found in the conception of experience advocated by these
authors, and against which James has been striving since his early works in the 1870s.
The  empirical  account  requires  that  experience  is  of  something  given and  that  all
mental faculties, even the highest ones, can be derived from experience. According to
James, it is important not to confuse experience with the mere presence of something
to our senses. In fact, not everything we feel, but only what awakens our interest enters
into our experience. Talking about the importance of interest in making the experience
and therefore of the selective activity of the mind poses the problem of introducing a
dimension  of  spontaneity  into  the  natural  explanation  of  the  development  of
knowledge. Even though the spontaneous activity of the human mind is an empirical
fact that is difficult to deny, authors such as Spencer prefer to avoid dealing with the
theoretical difficulties that such an admission entails and rather, as we shall see, to
consider:  “the  creatures  as  absolutely  passive  clay,  upon  which  ‘experience’  rains
down.” (PP I: 381). With his characteristic irony, James points out that following these
authors  in  considering  the  sentient  organism as  a  ‘passive  mirror’  only  shaped  by
experience – intended as a constant factor – one could imagine that even a race of dogs
repeatedly exposed to visual artistic stimuli would make them expert connoisseurs in
that field. Yet, James notes that: “Surely an eternity of experience of the statues would
leave the dog as inartistic as he was at first, for the lack of an original interest to knit
his discriminations on to.” (PP I: 381). In a nutshell, as Franzese (2009) pointed out, we
can talk for James of a “natural a priori” in so far as “[t]he interest itself, though its
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genesis is doubtless perfectly natural, makes experience more than it is made by it” (PP
I: 381). 
29 Interest is therefore considered to be the cause of our attention. We may be interested
in sensory or ideal objects, either directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily.25
By the way,  James has already defined “things” as groups of  sensible qualities that
interest us practically or aesthetically. Now, dealing with the effects of attention, he
tightens  a  possible  connection based on the  phenomenon of  the  habit  of  attention
between psychological attention and philosophical vision: “each of us literally chooses,
by his way of attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to
inhabit.” (PP I: 401). 
30 Two physiological processes seem to coexist in attentive acts, namely the process of
sensorial  adjustment and  that  of  internal  ideational  preparation of  the  brain-centers
concerned with the object attended to. Having already pointed out the importance of
voluntary attention in forming the core part of the self (Chapter X), and in view of the
subsequent identification of the will with attention (Chapter XXVI), here we come to
the  psychological  and  metaphysical  question  of  the  internal  forces  that  activate
psychological attention. The issue is delicate because it affects the defense of free-will,
which as we mentioned James does not find in the skeptical empiricism of Hume – a
fact  that offers the American psychologist  a  further reason for criticism. Quoting a
well-known  passage  from  Lucretius’  De  rerum  natura,26 two  theories  can  be
distinguished, the so-called effect-theory and the cause-theory of attention, and James
takes a clear stand in favor of the latter.27 A few pages earlier, talking about the process
of pre-perception (or ideational preparation) in attention, he left open the possibility of
a materialistic or spiritualist reading of the cause of the excitement of brain-centers
that comes from within the organism, not from the external object of attention. He
states that: “[w]hilst the object excites it [a brain-cell] from without, other brain-cells,
or  perhaps  spiritual  forces,  arouse  it  from  within.”  (PP I:  417).  The  answer  to  this
question,  whether  it  is  material  or  spiritual  forces  that  direct  our  capacity  for
attention, is not only a psychological option but inevitably a metaphysical one. Either
hypothesis  leads  to  different  world  views  that  James  summarizes  as  “materialism,
fatalism, monism” or “spiritualism, freedom, pluralism” (PP I: 424). The analysis of the
phenomenon of attention brings us back to the controversial issue of the causational
power of feeling,  which has already been addressed in the chapter dedicated to the
automaton theory (Chapter V), that is to say, whether feeling is a mere by-product of
brain activity, or performs some function of control over it. 
31 For James, it is evident that the plan by which one decides for the effect conception or
the causal conception is rather metaphysical since from a psycho-physiological point of
view  both  options  are  sustainable.  Material  laws  entirely  predetermine  the
phenomenon of attention if feeling is not recognized as having certain causal powers
(effect-theory).  Instead,  if  feeling  has  its  partial  autonomy  of  reaction  concerning
nervous processes, then it can be considered as a cause at least in a restricted sense.
Here we have an interesting passage: 
It does not necessarily follow, of course, that this reactive feeling should be “free”
in the sense of having its amount and direction undetermined in advance, for it
might  very  well  be  predetermined  in  all these  particulars.  If  it  were  so,  our
attention would not be materially determined,  nor yet  would it  be “free” in the
sense of being spontaneous or unpredictable in advance. (PP I: 424)
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32 His restriction of  the meaning of  the terms in use is  an essential  indication of  the
method  when  talking  in  psychology  about  issues  such  as  freedom,  that  have  a
philosophical history. However, above all, he attempts to propose a careful reading of
psychological phenomena, which, if on the one hand, it contrasts with reductionism in
a strictly materialistic sense, does not degenerate into an equally flawed and contrary
theory on the other. The effort of attention is a fundamental aspect of the conscious
will, and in James’s vision, there can be a collaboration between neural and spiritual
forces.28 As  is  evident,  the  polemical  object  is  still  the  arrogance  of  materialistic
scientism, which takes the form of Thomas H. Huxley’s automaton-theory.29 Already in
his 1879 article “Are We Automata?,”30 which was later integrated into his Chapter V of
Principles,  James  considered  both  Huxley’s  conscious-automaton  theory  and  the
opposite  theory  of  common sense  to  be  “conceptions  of  the  possible”  (EPs:  40).  In
particular, he stated that claiming the validity of one or the other based on aesthetic
preferences or relying on direct  (ostensive)  evidence of  the effectiveness of  mental
states would mark the methodological defeat of the scientific approach. In fact, against
the  common  sense  view,  the  materialistic  mechanicist  view  of  the  mind-brain
relationship considers mental states to be mere shadows or by-products of neurosis.
33 Here James argues that psychology has to recognize that causality is a metaphysical
issue.  However,  despite  the  fact  that  the  question  has  to  be  philosophically
investigated,  as  far  as  psychological  investigations  are  concerned,  the  vision  of
common sense claims causal power for feelings and ideas, while the vision of the so-
called “automatists” à la Thomas Huxley and William Clifford, denies causal power to
ideas and recognizes it only to physical matter. In this way, according to James, they
commit an illicit philosophical sin: either they accept Hume’s lesson that causation is
ultimately an unintelligible process, or they reject it entirely; one cannot pretend to
adhere  to  the  empirical  perspective  and  then  assign  in  principle  a  preference  to
material causality over psychic causality. 
34 Here is a significant passage in which James says that the causal power of feelings is
only to do with the reinforcement or inhibition of existing reflex currents, and that
“[t]he feelings can produce nothing absolutely new… and the original organization of
these [reflex currents] by physiological forces must always be the ground-work of the
psychological scheme” (EPs: 141).
35 Echoing  his  criticism of  Herbert  Spencer  smuggling  in  metaphysical  contents  after
psychological definitions, James was averse to mechanistic philosophy first and
foremost  for  ethical reasons.  Since  it  is  not  possible  to  verify  the  effectiveness  of
feelings and especially of the feeling of effort – which plays an important moral role in
his description of voluntary actions31 – the supporters of the materialistic vision should
not arrogate to themselves the right to define their theory as “scientific” and discredit
the others. The argument on which mechanists base their epiphenomenal theory about
mental states is a reasoning by analogy, which, as James argues, is: “drawn from rivers,
reflex actions and other material phenomena where no consciousness appears to exist
at all, and extended to cases where consciousness seems the phenomenon’s essential
feature.”  (PP  I:  429-30).  In  other  words,  it  is  a  metaphysical  and  not  a  scientific
impertinence  to  apply  equal  relationships  to  fields  of  knowledge  that  are  not
homogeneous, without considering the necessary distinctions. Thus, James proposes to
find circumstantial or presumptive evidence that can make the hypothesis of common
Novelty and Causality in William James’s Pluralistic Universe
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
12
sense supportable without pretending to prove it definitively in order to avoid the risk
of “non-scientific” conduct.
 
Non-Reductionist View of Consciousness’s
Causational Power 
36 James’s  reception  of  Darwinism is  evident  in  his  early  publications  and  becomes  a
relevant source for the development of his functional psychology. According to many
scholars, the Darwinian argument helped James to assess the autonomy of the mind
from the brain, therefore the activity of consciousness, as well as his view of the “mind
as a selective industry” and the spontaneity of its ideas. His original epistemological
endorsement of Darwin’s logic of evolution32 emerges in disagreement with Herbert
Spencer’s evolutionism (1878, in EP),  and even his argument against the automaton
thesis (or “epiphenomenalism” as we may call  it  today) is  revealing of  this debt to
Darwin’s view. Now James does not only criticize epiphenomenalism as a materialistic
theory  but,  as  recently  underlined  by  Brüntrup  and  Jaskolla,  he  also  offers  “an
inference to the best explanation when trying to give a metaphysical account of the
emergence of consciousness in evolution” (2016: 6). 
37 James  moves  from  the  observation  that  consciousness  is  a  general  universal  trait
shared  by  human  beings  and  higher  animals.  Within  an  evolutionistic  framework,
consciousness is an outcome of evolutionary processes, that is to say, it was selected by
nature. However, to be selected, it must be useful, and therefore, it cannot be a mere
by-product or inert epiphenomenon. In these first statements, James is excluding the
possibility that consciousness is a mere byproduct of evolution. In other words, James’s
theory  of  the  emergence  of  consciousness  is  an  anti-reductionist  and  anti-
epiphenomenalist theory.33 Universality, complexity (and preciseness) of consciousness
are essential characteristics that still today provoke biologists to decide which traits
are most probably results of the pressure of natural selection. 
38 Physiological studies offered empirical evidence for the causal activity of consciousness.
They  described  “higher”  brains  as  affected  by  significant  instability:  higher  nerve
centers  are  less  specialized  in  their  functions  and  perform  indeterminately  and
unforeseeably in comparison with those of the basal nucleus. The plasticity of higher
brains constitutes their most significant advantage. As a most indeterminate and vague
organ, the human brain can perform multiple adaptive activities, and adapt conduct to
the  minutest  alterations  in  the  environment,  so  much  so  that  it  needs  a  kind  of
assistance in pursuing its survival. The function of consciousness results fundamentally
from trying to avoid the side effects of the extreme responsiveness of our brain to the
environmental stimulations. 
The  brain  is  an  instrument  of  possibilities,  but  of  no  certainties.  But  the
consciousness,  with  its  own  ends  present  to  it,  and  knowing  also  well  which
possibilities  lead thereto and which away,  will,  if  endowed with causal  efficacy,
reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones.
(PP I: 141-2)
39 The evolutionary theory,  which agrees with the theory of  common sense as  to  the
efficacy  of  consciousness,  generally  considers  consciousness  as  a  superadded organ
which grows more complex and intense at higher stages of the animal kingdom and is
supposed  to  help  animals  in  their  struggle  for  existence.  However,  to  be  useful,
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consciousness for James has to be efficacious and influence nervous systems. The way
consciousness works is described as “selective industry”: it  selects and corroborates
particular “interests” while disregarding others according to the goals or purposes it
has  already  chosen.  It  “exert[s]  a  constant  pressure  in  the  right  direction”  by
reinforcing (or inhibiting) those nerve processes that are respectively functional (or
not), in order to reach the goal it has established. As James states, “the mind is at every
stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison
of these with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest.” (PP I:
277) (cf. Leary 2003). In this respect, whereas Spencer’s benchmark of adaptiveness was
the perfect correspondence of the mind with its environment (say perfect receptivity),
James suggests instead that the character of the indeterminacy of higher brains and the
spontaneity of the mind is an advantage in evolution (EPs: 42). The passivity of the
mind promoted instead by Huxley, Spencer, and other thinkers34 proves to be at least
less compatible both with scientific discoveries about cerebral physiology and mere
observational description of human behavior. The latter shows purposes which are not
immediately  connectable  with stimuli  present in  the environment (e.g.,  ideals,  etc.).
Moreover, an active and selective consciousness in organisms with “higher” nervous
centers would have been a consistent reply to the geological objection to evolution. The
geological  time supposed to be necessary for evolution to happen would have been
much  reduced  with  the  introduction  of  an  active  and  selective  factor  such  as
consciousness  (directionality  –  natural  teleology).  Other circumstantial  evidence for
the  effectivity  of  consciousness  was  the  correlation  between  subjective feelings  of
pleasure/pain and objective harmful/beneficial activities, as they could be explained in
evolutionary terms as being effective in adaptive activities,35 and in the recovery of
intellectual faculties in brain-damaged people. According to Richards, James derived
this  argument  from  Darwin’s  Descent  of  Man (1871),  and  his  conversations  with
Chauncey Wright.36 Indeed, even if he did not explicitly make clear his opinion, Darwin
was probably closer to Huxley in thinking that mental faculties were determined by
brain patterning (see Richards 1982: 411). 
40 To claim the spontaneity of mind and its impulsive nature helps us to argue in favor of
real activity and real novelty. A key aspect already revealed and carefully investigated
by McGranahan, Richards, and others, is the physiological and metaphysical role of the
“will”  in  the  Jamesian  vision.  We  must  overlook  here  James’s  long  quarrel  against
Wundt’s  conception  that  we  have  feelings  of  innervation.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  by
applying the law of parsimony, whereby consciousness tends to withdraw itself from all
actions  which  are  not  useful  for  leading  us  to  certain  ends,  once  some  internal
mechanisms  are  associated  and  work,  they  become  imperceptible  since  their
knowledge would be a mere complication for our ordinary life. This is also the case for
many voluntary movements, once there are established connections between mental
cues and particular movements. The simplest explanatory hypothesis being that these
mental  cues  are:  “memory-images  of  the  movement’s  distinctive  peripheral  effects,
whether  resident  or  remote.”  (PP II:  1108).  This  brings  us  to  the ideo-motor  action
theory, which, according to many interpreters, is one of the central assumptions of the
Jamesian theory of will and partly feeds his formulation of the theory of truth.37 More
specifically, James claims not only that the idea of the sensitive effects of movement is
enough to determine what our movements will be, but he also means that there is no
need for the further intervention of consciousness to agree to such movements being
performed: “Wherever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it
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in the mind, we have ideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing between the
conception and the execution.”  (PP II:  1130).  As  is  evident,  reflex actions and ideo-
motor actions are core assumptions of James’s theory of will. To understand his vision,
it is necessary to adopt an understanding of consciousness as embodied – as we would
call it today – which for James meant that consciousness shows an impulsive nature.
Thoughts and feelings are correlates of neural activities, they are “cross-sections […] of
currents whose essential consequence is motion” (PP II: 1134).38 
41 This brief parenthesis on the psychological conception of will  shows how there is a
close correlation between sensation-thought-action, and also reveals the background
on  which  the  Jamesian  conception  of  the  experience  of  activity  as  the  original
experience of our notion of causality is based. Deriving from the Darwinian argument,
McGranahan’s  analysis  of  the  possibility  of  introducing  real  novelties  by  means  of
voluntary actions is particularly impressive.39
 
Emergent Properties in Evolutionary Psychology 
42 Before considering the experience of activity presented by James in 1904, we will take a
look at the probably most metaphysical chapter of the Principles, or at least that which
James considered as such (PP I, Preface), the chapter on the theory of the mind-stuff.
This  theory  is  the  most  radical  form  of  the  theory  that  our  mental  states  are
compounds. Within the framework of evolutionist theory, all the new forms of being
are supposed to be results of the redistribution of original and unchanged materials. No
new nature, no factor that was not present at the beginning, can be introduced at a
later  stage.  However,  the  advent  of  consciousness  seems  to  introduce  something
genuinely new. For however small it may be, it is a real discontinuity in nature, and this
is  not  a  legitimate  assumption in  a  continuist  philosophy.  The  theory  of  evolution
works  better,  then,  if  it  is  possible  to  show that  in  some form,  consciousness  was
present at the origin of the world. The doctrine of atomistic hylozoism is an indispensable
part of a philosophy of evolution: originally there were atoms of matter that formed
bodies and brains and mental atoms that always by aggregation have merged to form
larger consciousnesses. The first duty of psychological evolutionism is to prove that
distinct  degrees  of  consciousness  already  existed  before  consciousness  appeared.
Although many authors, regardless of evolutionism, have argued for the existence of a
vast amount of subconscious mental life – like Fisk, Spencer, Taine – for James, the
theory of mind-stuff incurs two orders of difficulty: one physical and one logical. On
the level of physical analogy, the problem is that this theory disconnects feelings from
brain processes, arguing that the composition of a complex feeling takes place on the
mental-conscious  level  without  direct-immediate  physical  feedback.  On the  level  of
logic,  moreover,  the  self-composition  of  mental  facts  is  inadmissible.  All  the
combinations of which we have real knowledge are effects provoked by some other
entity  from  the  combined  units  so  that  without  a  medium,  the  notion  of  the
combination  does  not  make  any  sense.  Forces,  material  particles,  mental  elements
cannot be added together; their sum can only exist either for an external observer who
sees their combination or as some different effect produced on an external entity. As in
the  example  of  H2O,  molecules  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  combine  into  water,  thus
showing new properties. But, according to James: “‘water’ is just the old atoms in the
new position, H-O-H; the ‘new properties’ are just their combined effects, when in this
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position, upon external media, such as our sense-organs and the various reagents on
which water may exert its properties and be known.” (PP I: 161). The theory of mind-
stuff is unintelligible for the combination of multiple psychic units can only be either a
different wording of those same units or something different, which is a new addition
to those units.
43 The reason why James is interested in discussing the logic of the theory of mind-stuff is
that the latter explains the constitution of higher mental states by treating them as
identical to  lower  mental  states  combined.  What  James claims  is  that  they  are  not
identical but different: a higher mental state is not a collection of many lower mental
states,  but  it  is  itself.  The  occurrence  of  many  lower  mental  states,  or  of  brain
conditions that produce them, are undoubtedly the conditions for the emergence of a
higher mental state. However, this emerging state will be a completely new psychic
fact, which is different from saying that it is, instead, an ‘integration’ of lower mental
states – as the theory of mind-stuff wants it to be.
44 The issue of the compounding of consciousnesses will resurface as a constant concern
in James’s published and unpublished writings – not least to reply to Bode’s and Miller’s
criticisms.  These authors found James’s original idea that mental states are psychic
units  not  coherent  with  his  metaphysical  notion  of  “pure  experience.”40 Again  in
lecture V of A Pluralistic Universe, he goes back to the initial position he had adopted in
psychology against the self-compounding of higher-complex mental states from lower-
simpler  ones.  He  confesses  that  he  could  not  logically  accept  that:  “a  collective
experience of any grade whatever can be treated as logically identical with a lot of
distributive experiences” (PU: 86). 
 
A Radically Empiricist View of the Experience of
Activity
45 In 1904 James was elected president of the American Psychological Association for the
second time and his presidential address, then published in the Psychological Review in
1905,  and  again  as  Appendix B  of  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  focuses  precisely  on  the
experience of activity. These are the years in which James published his famous article
on the existence of consciousness as a function, discussing the related epistemological
and  metaphysical  issues.  He  maintains  a  sort  of  interdependence  of  his  radical
empiricism with its “rules of method,” namely the Pragmatic method and the principle
of pure experience: “Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every
kind  of  thing  experienced  must  somewhere  be  real.”  (ERE:  81).  Also,  from  this
perspective he tries to respond to the psychological question: “Have we perception of
activity?,”  the  metaphysical  question:  “Is  there  a  fact  of  activity?,”  and  a  logical
question: “Whence do we know activity?”
46 There  are  two  aspects:  that  the  experience  of  activity  characterizes  the  beings  as
experiencing  beings;  and  that  activity  as  apprehension  of  any  change  is  somehow
synonymous with the sense of life that, at least at a subjective level, is in continuous
and changing activity. Also, in the Essays, James spoke of conjunction relations as the
relations that a radical empiricist must try to rehabilitate, and here, activity as change
is one of them. The metaphysical question concerning activity emerges in relation to
whether  what  we  feel  to  be  activities  are  real activities.  For  James,  some  activity
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experiences are accompanied by desire, sense of direction, effort, and have a goal. The
central question is what drives activity into being: do our feelings make activity act, or
they are just signs of activity? James then considers our tendency to reduce reality to
the “immediately felt  activity-situation” for the benefit  of  different agents:  a  wider
consciousness,  or  certain  ideas  or  certain  nerve-cells.  The  meaning  of  these
alternatives is pragmatically intense because not merely verbal differences, but very
different actual results depend on the agent to which we choose to attribute real causal
power. The alternative is in the end between materialism and teleology, or between
forces acting blindly or with foresight in the world.
47 The  metaphysical  question  regarding  activity,  in  any  case,  depends  on  two  beliefs
regarding causality: “a belief that causality must be exerted in activity, and a wonder as
to how causality is made.” In the end, real activities bring us to the problem of creation.
At this point, James can only present his radically empiricist perspective on the matter.
He states that according to the methodical postulates mentioned above, somewhere the
that and what of “real creative activities” – if they exist – must be experienced as a
unity.  James  specifies  that  the  immediate  unitary  experience  should  not  be
misinterpreted. Sensations are fallible but rather as to the way we interpret them and
fix  their  meaning.  The only  possible  and correct  starting point  for  us  remains  our
concrete experience of causality. There is no possibility of getting out of it, insofar as it
would mean getting out of  our specific  sensibility,  and therefore of  human life.  He
strongly suggests that “real effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a ‘category’
[…] of reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction which our own
activity-series reveal” (ERE: 93-4). Here we encounter James’s effort to clarify the scope
of metaphysics as a form of knowledge, as mentioned in a 1904 letter to François Pillon
(CWJ 10: 409-10). James always looks for ends; his philosophy is teleological but not in
an essentialist way. Understanding the nature of causation would be essential in order
to use that knowledge to recognize actual causes or to foresee future developments in a
more  intelligent  way.  Quoting  some  passages  of  Royce’s  review  of  Stout’s  Analytic
Psychology, James agrees with his colleague about the fact that metaphysical problems –
such as the problem of effectual activity – are superficial unless they have a “possible
use in helping us to solve the far deeper problem of the course and meaning of the
world of  life” (ERE:  94).  Life is  full  of  significance,  full  of  meaning,  he repeats,  and
without explicating this as a goal (the “pragmatic note”) – which is also an evident
moral amelioration of our life and an integral engagement in all that is part of life –
philosophy and psychology lose their ultimate reason for existing.
 
Some Remarks in Conclusion
48 In  a  note  to  “The Experience of  Activity,”  James contests  the  accusation of  having
proposed  a  metaphysical  principle  of  activity.  All  he  has  deliberately  sustained  is
rather, he writes, “the indeterminism of our efforts” (ERE: 93n). The main object of the
criticism was his defense of free will, which however can be understood as the novelty
that human activity produces.
the only “free will” I have ever thought of defending is the character of novelty in
fresh  activity-situations.  If  an  activity-process  is  the  form  of  a  whole  “field  of
consciousness,” and if each field of consciousness is not only in its totality unique
(as is now commonly admitted) but has its elements unique (since in that situation
they are all dyed in the total), then novelty is perpetually entering the world and
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what happens there is not pure repetition, as the dogma of the literal uniformity of
nature requires. Activity-situations come in short each with an original touch. (ERE:
93n)
49 As one can read in this brief quotation, the attention to the personal dimension, and to
the creativity of human action constitute a central aspect of all Jamesian reflection. In
this perspective, the moral concern also plays a key role in James’s psychology as well
as  in  his  metaphysical  vision.  The  influence  of  Darwinism  and  his  view  of  the
emergence of fortuitous variations in nature helps James to formulate a conception of
novelty  as  emerging  from  natural  continuity,  and  to  formulate  an  anti-
epiphenomenalist argument on the emergence on consciousness. 
50 As we have tried to show, causality plays a crucial role in this subject. On the one hand,
it is one of the greatest metaphysical mysteries, and on the other hand, it is very often
misinterpreted in a materialistic and reductionist sense. This is not the sense in which
James  understands  causality,  which  in  his  view  remains  an  open  question,  and  in
Principles he even talks of the possible cooperation of neural and spiritual causes. His
philosophical  doctrine of  radical  empiricism and his  pluralistic  metaphysics mark a
step forward in this direction since he comes to postulate – in accordance with Bergson
and Peirce – a gradual infinitesimal growing of reality. A question to be investigated
concerns Miller’s and Bode’s criticism of the contradictions in James’s writings on pure
experience. There remains a tension between his profoundly anti-atomist conception of
reality  and  his  metaphysical  pluralism,  which  has  often  given  rise  to  many
misunderstandings,  and influenced the vision of other authors,  including, as is  well
known, that emergence of Whitehead. Further reflection on these aspects would be
important, as well as on the sociological interpretations of Jamesian psychology.
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NOTES
1. For an interesting reading of James’s theory of truth in an emergentist sense, see Pihlström
2007.
2. See Kim 2005; Clayton & Davies 2008; Meixner 2016. 
3. Achim Stephan proposes two versions of strong (synchronic and diachronic), and one of weak
emergentism, but in the end stronger versions of emergentism, which are incompatible with
property reductionism, can be considered “integrated” versions of weak emergentism, which is
instead compatible with property reductionism. Moreover, according to Stephan, weak theories
of emergence show three common characteristics: the thesis of physical monism, the thesis of
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systemic (or collective) properties and the thesis of synchronous determinism (cf. Stephan 1999:
50).
4. On the possibility of a “reconciling view” among the different interpretations of James as a
neutral monist, physicalistic naturalist, panpsychist, and phenomenologist see Cooper 1990.
5. We know that James will be dealing with this issue of “combination” for a long time and he will
return to it again in A Pluralistic Universe, see Moller 2001; Bella 2019. 
6. As  we shall  see,  since  the late  1970s,  James adopted Darwin’s  distinction between “different
operational  cycles  in  nature”:  the  causes  of  production  (fortuitous variations) and  the  causes  of
preservation (selection) and made this distinction an important element of his anti-deterministic
conception.
7. On the Notion of Reality as Changing (PU: 151-4).
8. The Russian elected legislative body.
9. See Peirce’s articles on The Monist (1891-1893) collected in the first volume of The Essential
Peirce (1992).
10. On this point, it is easy to observe a series of similarities with the Bergsonian conception of
real actions. However, one must not overlook the differences between their two philosophical
perspectives. See Madelrieux 2011; Teixeira 2011; Čapek 1950.
11. As  James  explains,  the  sensations  are  instead  the  result  of  a  psychological  work  of
discrimination: “No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day,
is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations.” (PP I: 219). 
12. This criticism of psychological atomism anticipates what he writes in Chapter X about different
conceptions  of Self .  From  the  belief  in  “permanent  self-identical  psychic  facts  that  absent
themselves and recur periodically” follows the “Humian doctrine that our thought is composed
of  separate  independent  parts”  and  our  Self  is  a  theatre  of  representations.  Whereas,  from
James’s  description  of  mental  facts  as  vague  and  changing  descends  the  description  of
consciousness as a  sensibly continuous  stream and the Self as  the corresponding succession of
presently felt states of consciousness.
13. This is not the result of an inference from the perception of the succession of the temporal
parts of thoughts; on the contrary, it is a single sensible perception whose parts are inseparable. 
14. I am referring to the critical edition edited by Burkhardt and Bowers in 1979 because, as is
now well known, in 1911 Horace M. Kallen, a pupil and friend of James, edited a first version of
the text based on two existing manuscripts. Ralph B. Perry revised the 1911 edition, which was
introduced  by  James’s  son,  Henry  Jr.  James.  Subsequently,  with  the  discovery  of  a  third
manuscript  revised  by  James  himself,  Kallen’s  version  was  revised  and  expunged  from  his
comments  and  interventions  generally  considered  too  personal  (see  SPP:  v-ix;  153ff).  In  the
edition edited by Kallen, the problem of novelty and its sub-problems appear from chapter IX to
XIII. 
15. James  proposes  his  doctrine  of  radical  empiricism,  first  in  WB,  Preface;  and later  in  The
Meaning of Truth (MT). 
16. Cf. ERE: 93n.
17. James shows how one can shift from the original meaning of the definition to other meanings
only by adding or avoiding considering some of its words. This practice led to the derivation of
undue logical implications from the definition following the interpreters’ view. 
18. In Darwin’s theory of evolution James detects two different cycles of operation in nature
relatively independent of one other: “the causes which originally produced the peculiarity in him
and the causes that maintained it after it is produced.” (WB: 167).
19. “The original form in which fact come is the perceptual durcheinander, holding terms as well
as relations in solution, or interfused and cemented.” (SPP: 100-1).
20. In this regard, I think it is interesting to reread the debate of that period on the meaning of
the explanatory capacity of psychological hypotheses. See Bella 2018.
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21. John S.  Mill  and  John  Venn  talk  about  causes  respectively  as  unconditional and  close
antecedents.  Peirce wrote a review of  John Venn’s  1867 work The Logic  of  Chance (Writings  of
Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 98-102). John Venn is also quoted by James in
chapter XXI of Principles, where James considers the relations of belief and will.
22. James points out that particular attention is paid to the perception of causal activity. In this
regard we have a tendency to skepticism that is not found in other experiences in which we also
make perceptual errors.
23. His logical objection consists in stating that since cause-effect is a transitive relation, the
causal connection holds between the external terms even if the intermediate neural, muscular,
and instrumental connections are skipped.
24. “Perception has given us a positive idea of causal agency, but it remains to be ascertained
whether what first appears as such is really such, whether aught else is really such, or finally
whether nothing really such exists. Since with this we are led immediately into the mind-brain
relation,  and  since  that is  such  a  complicated  topic,  we  had  better  interrupt  our  study  of
causation provisionally at the present point, meaning to complete it when the problem of the
mind’s relation to the body comes up for review.” (SPP: 109).
25. There are several varieties of attention: attention can be sensorial or intellectual; immediate
or derived (apperceptive); passive or active (see PP I: 395ff). 
26. “Principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, ex infinito ne causam causa sequitur.” (PP I: 424).
27. In this case, Ewald Hering is the author of reference, even though James indicates ambiguities
in his treatment, cf. PP I: 425n. 
28. “No object can catch our attention except by the neural machinery. But the amount of the
attention which an object receives after it has caught our mental eye is another question. It often
takes effort to keep the mind upon it. We feel that we can make more or less of the effort as we
choose. If this feeling be not deceptive, if our effort be a spiritual force, and an indeterminate
one, then of course it contributes coequally with the cerebral conditions to the result. Though it
introduce no new idea, it will deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of innumerable ideas
which else would fade more quickly away.  The delay thus gained might not be more than a
second in duration – but that second may be critical.” (PBC: 257).
29. James’s  reviews  of  T. Huxley’s  Lectures  on  the  Elements  of  Comparative  Anatomy  (1864)  and
A. Wallace’s  essay “The Origin of  Human Races  and the Antiquity  of  Man Deduced from the
Theory of ‘Natural Selection’” (1864) are in ECR: 197-205; 206-8.
30. “Are We Automata?,” Mind, 1 January 1879, Vol. 4 (13), 1-22.
31. In Woodward’s introduction to the Essays in Psychology, on the question of feelings of effort,
James’s afferent view of sensation is in open contrast with Helmholtz and Wundt. However, in
addition to the action of muscular feelings, which refers to effect-theory, James admits moral
feelings and refers to them as the cause-theory (cf. PP II: 1167n). In short, his concern is to keep
together the importance of reflex actions for the current psychology and to safeguard, however,
a  spontaneous  dimension  of  voluntary  behavior.  See  EPs:  xx-xxi.  For  an  accurate  and  quite
innovative analysis of James’s moral view see Marchetti 2015.
32. See McGranahan 2017; Pearce 2018; Klein 2016; Richards 1982; Wiener 1949.
33. “As odd as it may sound today, James invokes Darwinism to defy mechanistic reductionism,
rather than viewing it as part and parcel of reductionistic modern science. Today we would call
James’s  Darwinian  functionalist  account  of  consciousness  an  adaptationist hypothesis,  or  a
speculation about the origin of trait based upon its apparent function.” (McGranahan 2017: 80).
34. James  and  Hodgson  were  attacking,  and  Spencer  was  defending  what  is  now  called
epiphenomenalism, “the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but
have  no  effects  upon  any  physical  events”  (Robinson  2015).  James’s  criticism  of  the  causal
conception  of  perception  was  recovered  by  Putnam  (1999)  against  Jaegwon  Kim’s
“psychophysical  supervenience.”  According  to  Putnam,  Kim’s  theory  is  a  sophisticated
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combination of Cartesianism and materialism that still presupposes a conception of perception
mediated  by  internal  representations.  Putnam clearly  understood  the  importance  of  James’s
criticism  for  “natural  realism”  –  a  notion  that  James  tried  to  elaborate  and  that  was  later
recovered  by  R. B. Perry  and  Montague, but  also  by  Moore  and  B. Russell.  The  problem  of
Putnam’s “direct realism,” in the sense of James’s “natural realism,” was a serious problem also
for philosophers of language like Austin. According to Putnam, Austin’s analysis of the language
of perception can be read in close relation to James’s criticism. Only by abandoning a conception
of perception as mediated by internal representations it is possible for Putnam to overcome the
traditional Cartesian problems perpetrated in philosophy of mind and epistemology.
35. In his anonymous review of the Principles of Psychology, Peirce will respond to this.
36. James  quotes  Wright  (1873)  in  his  1875  review  of  Wundt’s  Grundzüge  der  physiologischen
Psychologie.
37. As Francesca Bordogna perfectly summed up: “for James a voluntary act follows simply from
the fact that one idea has been able to capture the mind’s attention, either because it succeeded
in predominating over other antagonistic or inhibitory ideas, or because it was actively selected
in view of certain interests or purposes of the knower. In either case, action follows simply from
the motor power of the idea.” (Bordogna 1998: 88n).
38. “Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling
may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in voluntary life.” (PP II: 1135).
39. On James’s  teleological  understanding of  free-will  see  McGranahan 2017;  Bordogna 2008;
Pawelski 2007.
40. See MEN: 65-129. See also Moller (2001; 2008). However, he also states: “I hold to it still as the
best  description  of  an  enormous  number  of  our  higher  fields  of  consciousness.  They
demonstrably  do  not  contain the  lower  states  that  know  the  same  objects.  Of  other  fields,
however, this is not so true; so, in the Psychological Review for 1895, vol. ii: 105 (see especially:
119-20), I frankly withdrew, in principle, my former objection to talking of fields of consciousness
being made of simpler ‘parts,’ leaving the facts to decide the question in each special case.” (PU:
87).
ABSTRACTS
The issue of the emergence of genuinely new events in a paradigm of natural continuity has been
analyzed in different fields by Pragmatists authors like Peirce, Dewey, and Mead. Another way to
consider the problematic relationship between novelty and continuity is by considering William
James’s understanding of causal connections. This article addresses the concept of causality that
James  repeatedly  addressed  and  deeply  rethought  throughout  his  career.  I  believe  that  the
concept of causality provides an excellent platform from which to view the various aspects that
have made James’s epistemological and metaphysical thinking so influential in the history of
theories of emergence, and which is experiencing currently a major revival.
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